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cautious about confusing short term 
macroeconomic performance with 
the economy’s fundamental long 
term health. Questions must also 
be asked about how critical export 
growth is to the Japanese economy.
I. Trade Balance
Weak projections for Japanese growth 
are linked to arguments that the 
economy is reliant on exports and 
therefore foreign economic condi-
tions. Certainly nominal exports 
have fallen by almost 3% in 2008. 
Nominal Imports have also started 
to decreased due to weak domestic 
demand. It should be noted that the 
high nominal value of total imports 
in recent years is accounted for by 
a rise in import prices rather than 
an increase in volume (Table 1). 
Recent economic indicators of the 
performance of the Japanese econ-
omy have been weak and prognosis 
negative.1 In December Japanese 
industrial output contracted by 10%. 
In January this trend intensifi ed. 
Moreover Toyota has announced 
7,000 job losses and Honda a four 
month closure of their UK plant. 
Other labour market indicators 
and consumption related data sug-
gest that the negative shock in the 
manufacturing sector is spreading 
gradually to the household sector.2 
Paul Kurgan, has suggested 
that the Japanese economy is in 
‘free fall’ as is world trade.3 This 
view can be linked to those who 
accuse Japan of relying on exports 
for growth and contributing to 
international imbalances that lie at 
the heart of the current fi nancial 
crisis.4 Nevertheless one must be 
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By contrast, the total value 
of real exports and imports has 
shown sharp falls (Figure 1).
Real exports have been on an 
upward trajectory since at least 
1975 (Figure 1). Particularly strik-
ing, however, is the steep upward 
trend from 2002 to 2008 and subse-
quent dramatic fall. According to 
JP Morgan Global Data Watch, the 
decline in real export growth acceler-
ated to -68.6% in January 2009 and 
-73.1% in February, compared to 
–48.1% in December 2008 (season-
ally adjusted annual rate)5. These 
falls have impacted most heavily 
Table 1: Nominal Exports and Imports 
Name of  
time-series
Total Exports 
(million ¥)
Year-on-year % 
growth rate
Total Imports 
(million ¥)
Year-on-year % 
growth rate
1996 435,660 347,172
1997 495,190 13.66 374,211  7.79
1998 488,663 -1.32 331,138 -11.51
1999 457,948 -6.29 320,163  -3.31
2000 495,256  8.15 371,538 16.05
2001 465,835 -5.94 381,821  2.77
2002 494,797  6.22 379,294 -0.66
2003 519,341  4.96 399,576  5.35
2004 582,951 12.25 443,929 11.10
2005 626,318  7.44 522,971 17.81
2006 716,308 14.37 621,665 18.87
2007 797,254 11.30 674,030  8.42
2008 773,522 -2.98 733,183  8.78 
Jan-09  32,822 -  41,266 -
Feb-09  29,934 -  38,584 -
Source: Bank of Japan
Figure 1: Real Exports and Imports
Source: Bank of Japan
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on Japanese manufacturing, par-
ticularly small firms that are highly 
exposed to foreign orders (Table 2).
Real imports also have been 
declining since October 2008 as 
the pace of the domestic contrac-
tion has accelerated, particularly 
for the last two months (Jan-Feb). 
These falls in imports reflect an 
environment of weakened domes-
tic demand and pessimism.
As a result of high oil and other 
commodity prices in 2007 and first 
half of 2008, outflows of income 
from Japan have increased (Figure 2: 
Table 3). The Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI) esti-
mated that Japan’s trading loss was 
approximately 21 trillion yen in 
2007 (6% higher than in 2006).6 The 
indications are that this has lead 
the Government to recognise the 
need for major structural change in 
the Japanese economy. METI has 
recommended that Japanese firms 
invest to improve resource produc-
tivity and strengthen mechanisms 
for innovation to heighten added 
values of products and services.7 
However, there are longstanding 
debates (both within the Japanese 
and English language literature) 
over the extent and effectiveness 
of Japanese Government efforts at 
directing investment activity.8
Japan has had a real trade surplus 
only sporadically: 1980-1987; 1992-
1993; 1997-2000; 2002-2008; and again 
in February 2009. The real trade sur-
plus increased by more than 200% for 
the period 2005-2008 (Figure 3). Much 
of this is explained on the export 
side. An export boom was main-
tained by the increase in worldwide 
consumption arguably facilitated 
by a so-called ‘credit bubble’. The 
Table 2: Ministry of Finance Business Outlook Survey Index 
Large firms 3Q 2008 4Q 2008
all industries -10.2 -35.7
manufacturers -10.0 -44.5
non-manufacturers -10.2 -30.5
Small firms
all industries -34.3 -40.7
manufacturers -34.7 -51.3
non-manufacturers -34.3 -38.5
Source: JP Morgan, Global Data Watch, March 2009
Table 3: Bank of Japan Overseas Commodity Index
Month Index Month Index
January 2008 168.1 August 2008 198.1
February 2008 186.5 September 2008 164.6
March 2008 185.9 October 2008 110.7
April 2008 198.2 November 2008  94.8
May 2008 213.4 December 2008  75.8
June 2008 236.7 January 2009  88.2
July 2008 217.6 February 2009  89.8
Source: Bank of Japan
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bursting of this and consequently 
of the Japanese ‘export bubble’ has 
naturally had an effect on inventory, 
production and employment levels.
II. Current Account
In January 2009 the Japanese cur-
rent account went into deficit for the 
first time since 1996, but recovered 
sharply in February (Figure 4). 
Which as been the usual case in the 
relatively few previous instances of 
monthly deficits. Which reinforces 
the view of Japan’s current account 
surplus being structural. Reflecting 
a low propensity to import, a highly 
competitive export sector, diversi-
fied production base substituting for 
imports and an economy unreliant 
on foreign capital. This emerging 
structure is deeply rooted histori-
cally and traceable back to at least 
as far as the inter-war period.9 
However, while the surplus had 
been supported by the exports of 
production and services for dec-
ades, from 2005 portfolio and direct 
foreign investment income took a 
leading role (Figure 5). The former 
accompanied the accelerated spread 
of complex financial instruments 
(equity and debt securities) in the 
international capital markets. How-
ever, questions must be raised about 
whether this marks a long-term 
structural shift or merely amounts to 
a short term temporary phenomenon.
Indications are that the latter 
would seem to be the case. Portfolio 
investment is now on a downward 
trend in line with the international 
credit crunch and the collapse of 
major financial institutions. For 
example, there were large losses for 
Figure 2: Overseas Commodity Price Index
Figure 3: Real Trade Boom from 2002 to Jan 2008  
(trade balance, seasonally adjusted)
Source: Bank of Japan
Source: Bank of Japan
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hedge funds in Asia throughout 2008. 
The top ten Asian funds saw assets 
fell on average by 50% compared 
to 21.5% for European based funds, 
and 25.3% for all funds.10 The total 
estimated assets managed by hedge 
funds decreased by 23.2% in 4Q of 
2008 to US$1,932 trillion. However, 
it should be stressed that the total 
assets administered by the top 10 
Asian hedge funds accounted for 
only 1.38% of global managed assets 
in 4Q of 2008 (see Table 4). That is, 
Asia has not been a major field of 
activity or base for hedge funds.
Furthermore, according to the 
Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, 
the unwinding of positions by hedge 
funds due to redemptions requested 
by their clients is likely to be one 
of the causes of the fall in Japanese 
stock prices and the appreciation of 
the exchange rate.11 The repatria-
tion of capital into Japan following 
the unwinding of the carry trade is 
also likely to explain the temporary 
fall in the current account surplus. 
III. Trade Partners
In terms of trading partners, Japan 
has a regular surplus with Asia, the 
EU, the US and Central & South 
America (Figure 6). It maintains 
a deficit with China (although 
relatively close to balance) and with 
countries from which it imports 
commodities - Australia, the Middle 
East and Africa (Figure 7). The deficit 
against the Middle East increased by 
177% from mid-2005 to reach almost 
¥45,391 million in the 3Q of 2008. 
While the current account 
surplus with the EU has been 
on an upward trend since 2002, 
Figure 4: Quarterly Current and Trade Account Balances 1996-2009
Figure 5: Quarterly Income Flows 1996-2009
Source: Bank of Japan
Source: Bank of Japan
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when the export bubble began to 
emerge, it has been overtaken by 
the surplus with the rest of Asia. 
Particularly sensitive politically, 
has been Japan’s current account 
surplus with the US which oscil-
lated for almost a decade around 
¥25,000 million until the 4Q of 2005. 
The large and persistent Japanese 
and Chinese current account sur-
pluses are seen as a major cause of 
the current financial crisis12. After 
2005 the Japanese structural surplus 
was then greatly augmented, sup-
ported by an inflationary rise of 
dividends, equity and debt income 
in the context of the credit bubble.
IV. Asian Trade
Japan’s current account surplus with 
Table 4: Top 10 Hedge Fund Administrators with funds in Asia
Hedge Funds
Asian assets under administra-
tion (US$ billion) 4Q 2008
Asian assets as a % of total 
assets under administration 
Citco Fund Services 11.25  3
RBC Dexia Investor Services  2.75  10
OpHedge Investment Services, LLC  2.15  6
Trident trust  2.12  10
NAV CONSULTING, Inc  2.00  8
Harmonic Fund Services  1.90  12
SS&C Fund Services  1.50  2
Kingsway Taitz Fund Adm  1.40 100
Citi  0.86  1
Meridian Fund Services  0.80  7
Total 26.72
Source: www.hedgefund.net
Figure 6: Bilateral current account surpluses with Asia, the EU, 
the US and Central & South America
Source: Bank of Japan
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Asia has risen dramatically since 
2002. Much of this can be explained 
by an increase in the trade surplus 
(Figure 8). Trade of services such 
as transportation, construction and 
communication are much less impor-
tant and only turned into surplus in 
2006 and 2007. Portfolio investment 
income likewise has a relatively 
minor role (Figure 9). The most 
important component of the income 
flows in the Asia Pacific region is 
direct investment income which has 
risen steadily during the 2000s (see 
Figure 10). This is arguably part of 
a permanent long term trend and 
linked to a continued expansion of 
Japanese foreign direct investments 
in Asia over the last two decades.
Although causation is not neces-
sarily implied, capital outflows from 
Japan to emerging markets have 
risen in accordance with the Japanese 
Government’s current economic 
growth and regional strategies. 
METI recommends the develop-
ment of a system that will foster the 
flow back of income to Japan from 
emerging countries in Asia. The 
new growth mechanism reinforces 
competitiveness via commitment 
of channelled-back funds to future 
innovations and distributing them to 
household income.13 It is hoped that a 
change in the investment strategies of 
Japanese affiliated firms abroad will 
redirect income from foreign markets 
back into to the country and provide 
the foundations of productivity 
growth. However, economic integra-
tion in East Asia continues to deepen 
via trade and research partnerships 
with ASEAN.14 Arguably this is a 
recognition by the Japanese Govern-
ment that in a mature, post-catch up 
high speed growth economy new 
Figure 7: Bilateral current account deficits with China, Australia, 
Africa and Middle East
Figure 8: A trade and current account surplus with Asia 
Source: Bank of Japan
Source: Bank of Japan
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ways need to be found to find high 
yielding investments. On the one 
hand is a desire to tap into low capi-
tal/labour ratios in East Asia where 
returns are higher and on the other 
to use the income from this export 
of capital to identify future domestic 
industries and deal with problems 
associated with an aging population.
V. Conclusions 
Just how important is this fall in 
exports for the Japanese economy? 
If, as is often presumed, Japan is 
an export-led economy, the results 
are likely to be very large. Figure 
11 disaggregates Japanese GDP 
growth into its major components. 
Certainly movements in net 
exports would appear to have a dis-
proportionate effect on GDP growth, 
implying that the cyclical movements 
in the Japanese economy has been 
tied to exports and to a lesser extent 
fiscal stimulus. However, it is clear 
that policies such as macro-economic 
stimulus or exchange rate deprecia-
tion, while possibly at best a short 
term panacea for cyclical downturns 
(at worst a major cause of domestic 
and even international asset price 
inflation) are not likely to lead to 
sustained and substantial increases 
in Japanese economic growth. Such 
changes, if deemed desirable, require 
permanent substantial increases in 
Japanese domestic consumption and 
investment rates. This is a hard task: 
the Japanese economy is a mature 
one where high yielding investments 
are not easily found. Nevertheless, 
the Japanese Government’s policy 
of encouraging direct investment in 
East Asia while using income from 
Figure 9: Income from Portfolio Investments in the Asian region
Figure 10: Income from Japanese Direct Investments in the 
Asian region
Source: Bank of Japan
Source: Bank of Japan
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this source to find new innovative 
post-high speed growth industries 
would seem appropriate. Calls from 
the US government and US based 
economists on Japan to use conven-
tional macro-economic solutions to 
deal with the international recession 
insofar as it relates to the problems of 
inbuilt imbalances are and a mature 
economy would appear on the basis 
of this discussion to be misguided. 
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Figure 11: During the export bubble all GDP components went 
up particularly Investment and Net Export (nominal percentage 
changes)
Source: Statistics of National Accounts, Japan
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